A Q&A w/ the recently publicly released Kerr Report
Intelligence and analysis on Iraq: Issues for the Intelligence Community
(scanned image pdf)* (c&p-able text pdf)** (html)**

Q: Why was the Iraq WMD intel not as good as it shopuld have been?
A: Iraq didn't get enough attention because the CIA was busy combating terrorism and WMD proliferation.

from the Kerr Report, p5:
Iraq was not the only significant intelligence problem facing the Community in the years immediately preceding the war. Counter terrorism and counter proliferation were given higher priority ...

Bureaucratic drollery no doubt.
Least ways, I'm roflmao.

Q: What about the Saddam Hussein - al-Qa'ida linkage?
A: The report says that despite the US Intelligence Community's purposely aggressive, exhaustive and repetitive searches for such a relationship, their assessment was and still is that no operational or collaborative relationship existed.

from the Kerr Report, p11:
In the case of al-Qa'ida, the constant stream of questions aimed at finding links between Saddam and the terrorist network caused analysts take what they termed a “purposely aggressive approach” in conducting exhaustive and repetitive searches for such links. Despite the pressure, however, the Intelligence Community remained firm in its assessment that no operational or collaborative relationship existed.

All of Team Bush's cacophonous din to the contrary was made in spite of the Best Information Available at the Time.

Q: Is irony really dead?
A: No. As matter of fact, irony still abounds and is as plentiful as ever.

from the Kerr Report, p2:
In an ironic twist, the policy community was receptive to technical intelligence (the weapons program), where the analysis was wrong, but apparently paid little attention to intelligence on cultural and political issues (post-Saddam Iraq), where the analysis was right
The story's not very leggy yet; yet, ...

Report: Intel analysts pressured to find al-Qaida, Saddam links

October 14, 2005
Intelligence analysts were under heavy administration pressure before the Iraq war to find links between Saddam Hussein’s government and al-Qaida, causing them to take a “purposely aggressive approach” to the issue, according to a newly declassified CIA report.
The analysts never found such ties and remained firm in their conviction that “no operational or collaborative relationship existed,” the report said
Copyright 2005 The Associated Press

White House Ignored CIA Warnings on Iraq
The White House disregarded intelligence projections on post-Saddam Iraq according to a newly-declassified CIA report ...
The report, from July 2004, is the third of three prepared by a group of intelligence experts led by Richard J. Kerr, a former deputy director of central intelligence, to examine the U.S. Intelligence Community's assessments in the months before the U.S. invasion. The first two reports remain classified ...
... first reported by USA Today on October 12 and is featured in an article by Douglas Jehl in [10-13's] New York Times. The text of the report was published this month with an edited introduction in the CIA's Studies in Intelligence journal (Vol. 49, No. 3). The complete, unedited version of the report was declassified in response to a Freedom of Information Act request and appeal by National Security Archive senior fellow Jeffrey Richelson.

GWU's NatlSecArchive

Irrrationally Informed
20 Oct 2005 by Simon W. Moon