SSCI Iraq Report Part II- my new project
My latest project is to secure at least a "no comment" from each memeber of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (or their spokeperson).
Background:
As per the SSCI's charge and jurisdiction to "to oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government," and "to provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to assure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States," the committe set about to investigate certain aspects of the invasion of Iraq. These were as follows:

1.the quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein’s threat to stability and security in the region, and his repression of his own people;
2.the objectivity, reasonableness, independence, and accuracy of the judgments reached by the Intelligence Community;
3.whether those judgments were properly disseminated to policy makers in the Executive Branch and Congress;
4.whether any influence was brought to bear on anyone to shape their analysis to support policy objectives; and
5.other issues we mutually identify in the course of the Committee’s review.

Pay special attention to number 5 there. This is the crucial one for our discussion. This catch-all is what opened the door for the second SSCI report re the Iraq intel. Subsequently, the SSCI "unanimously agreed to refine the terms of reference" in part to investigate charges that Senator Kyl (R, AZ) called "close to an allegation of treason."

Here's the list of the additional terms of reference:

B. the collection of intelligence on Iraq from the end of the Gulf War to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom;
C. whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information;
D. the postwar findings about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and weapons programs and links to terrorism and how they compare with prewar assessments;
E. prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq;
F. any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and
G. the use by the Intelligence Community of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC).

More to folow shortly...
21 Apr 2005 by Simon W. Moon
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