The Saddam Tapes and the 2006 Intelligence Summit
The Saddam Tapes and the 2006 Intelligence Summit

Initial impression - meh. A propaganda indoctrination for a fee event.
Initial notes follow.

An Iranian reform group was there. Couldn't help wonder if it was some incarnation of the MeK.

The opening speaker, Dr. Katz, said that we were at greater peril now than we were during WWII.
He said we're in even greater peril at this moment than we were during the Cuban missile crisis. I'm not sure how much worse than MAD he thinks things could get.
He was just trying to get everybody pumped up about the few $K of company and taxpayers' money that each attendee was dropping. Help them to convince themselves that their attendance at the Summit was to avert a vague fate worse than nuclear winter - a veritable "downward spiral of untold suffering." Being here was part an important mission to save the world not just an expense paid weekend out of town in the Crystal City Hyatt.

To further inspire us, Dr. Katz parahrased Krushchev while banging the podium with an imitation of Nikita's shoe. It seems when he rehearsed it, he imagined a response of some sort from the audience - cheers, polite applause, or at least a swelling of some sort. It was sort of awkward.

Then Mr. Loftus, one of the event organizers, tells us that John Negroponte's "trying to dismiss the tapes. Loftus said that Bill Tierney received CD in 2005-08. Loftus said that there're discussions about Saddam's plans to assassinate other Arab leaders, "launch[ing] a weapons of mass destruction sneak attack by proxy against America, conceal[ing] his WMD stock and expand[ing] production under the nose of UN inspectors," on the tapes.

Let's just get this out of the way to start:
Bill Tierney thinks Iraq had nukes and that there's a conspiracy in the US govt to cover up Iraq's role in the Oklahoma City bombings and to hide Russia's involvement w/ Iraq's WMDs and WMD programs. He's an unreformed Mylroie conspiracist.
[The .ppt slide show referred to below can be found here:]

[slides 57 - 68]
Mr. Tierney said that the discussion of electrical "projects" relates to nuclear weapons technologies because the old-fashioned way of enriching uranium took great amounts of electricity. He then notes that there is discussion of "fission bombs" and "special bombs." Tierney then speculates as to what the special bombs might be. He rules out radiological devices because they don't require vast amounts of electricity the way that uranium enrichment does. He then goes on to surmise that they must be talking about hydrogen bombs - fusion bombs. Why he reaches this conslusion is unclear. It's as if he thinks the great amount of electricity to enrich uranium means that special bombs must be nuclear of some sort.
Why even include radiological bombs on the list of possibilities for the meaning of 'special bombs' when they're not indicated by your clue- massive electrical usage?

[slide 109]
Mr. Tierney read aloud, "We have built a factory to produce bomb systems," instead of what was written which was, "We have built a factory to produce plasma systems." An interesting slip-up.

[Slide 123]
Mr. Tierney makes a point to note that "Both briefers want to expand their capability beyond the original intent of nuclear weapons development." This seems to run counter his argument that this section of tape is somehow alarming.
Tierney said, "Their attitude is,'We, we've got all this base capability and there are different things we can use it for. They [the briefers] would constantly throw out ideas along this line."

[Slides 144 - 148]
Mr. Tierney said, "I'm taking it from the context that Saddam has been reading these, these assessments from the US.
"He [Hussein] is reading this and saying, 'Yeah. It's a good idea isn't it?"

Hussein's said to've said,"... they said in the future they would see a car [unintelligible] a nuclear explosion in, for example, Washington . . or germ, or chemical. This is coming,this story is coming, but not from Iraq... It is coming from others.

Tierney said, "So he's, this is just like, um, brainstorming. They're just throwing things out there. Let me make it clear, this is not a deliberate plan and they're going through exactly what's going to happen when. They're... This's... You're, you're seeing what's going on in their hearts and minds come out through their, their mouths."

[slide 152]
Mr. Tierney was partcularly concerned about this passage from Tariq Aziz:
"Yes, care with all the shibabish. I mean, if actually, there is going to be destruction, I think our position is not going to be strong."

Tierney said, "It's obvious he [Tariq Aziz] thinks biological is the way to go. So in his response he says, 'actually, if there's going to be destruction, I think our position is not going to be strong.'
Do you get destruction with biological or chemical weapons? No you don't. I mean Why did he say that if they didn't have a nuclear weapon (being built?) in 1996."

Audio selections from the presentation to follow.


Here's a bit about the speaker Bill Tierney as featured on the hit radio show Coast to Coast AM:

Iraq: The Smoking Gun?
Bill Tierney, a former weapons inspector who worked with UNSCOM in Iraq in the late 1990s ... ... believes that Iraq has nuclear capability and the intention to use such weapons. ... claims that he has pinpointed a hidden location in Iraq ... where there is a uranium enriching processing facility.

Tierney's methods of ascertaining this location ... "I would ask God and just get a sense if something was valid or not, and then know if I needed to pursue it," he said. His assessments through prayer were then confirmed to him by a friend's clairvoyant dream, where he was able to find the location on a map. "Everything she said lined up."

Well at least he got verification. It would have been sheer nuttery not to verify the divinely inspired, uranium enrichment facility homing ability with a friend's "clairvoyant dream."
18 Feb 2006 by Simon W. Moon

Precedents, Variables, and Options in Planning a U.S. Military Disengagement Strategy from Iraq
From Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
Precedents, Variables, and Options in Planning a U.S. Military Disengagement Strategy from Iraq

The U.S. administration has defined a central part of its approach to the situation as “leaving Iraq better than we found it.4
[Maximally,] empowering a decent and accountable government [w/] strong indigenous security forces ... [Minimally,] ... a stable government ... continued national unity of Iraq ... as well as the avoidance of civil war.5
... withdrawal ... under these circumstances ... some important victories [but no immediate] Western-style democracy [nor direct] support the program of greater Middle East democratization.6
... many Iraqis have shown strong interest in the rapid departure of U.S. forces from their country ... others are at least ambivalent [re] the timing of such a withdrawal.7
22 Dec 2005 by Simon W. Moon

More Iran's iraq

Iran gaining influence, power in Iraq through militia
Posted on Mon, Dec. 12, 2005
By Tom Lasseter
Knight Ridder Newspapers
[U.S. and Iraqi officials:]... Iranian-backed .. Badr Organization [conducts] ... many of the Iraqi Interior Ministry's intelligence activities and [has] infiltrated ... elite commando units ...
...some [officials] agreed to speak only on the condition of anonymity for fear of violent reprisals, [saying] the Interior Ministry [was] an Iranian fifth column ... [w/] death squads and ... secret prisons.

"They're putting millions of dollars into the south to influence the elections ... it's funded primarily through their charity organizations and also Badr and some of these political parties," "A lot of their guys (Badr) are going into the police and military."
[--Gen. George W. Casey]

[Iraqi] ministry officials [& ex-officials]: [US] hadn't interfered ... because [they] weren't fully aware ... or because [of the risks of] arresting militia leaders [w/] powerful political positions and tens of thousands of followers.

Interior Ministry and Badr officials ... denied ... involvement in the prisons or death squads ... :

"All prisons in the south and most of those in Baghdad are run by the Badr militia,"
[--Gen. Muntadhar Muhi al-Samaraee ex-Interior Ministry special forces chief]

Al-Samaraee ... denied Interior Ministry accusations [he stole a car &] fled to Jordan ...

Badr's leader, Hadi al-Amari, has denied maintaining ties to Iran ...

"Allawi receives money from America, from the CIA, but nobody talks about that. All they talk about is our funding from Iran," "We are funded by some (Persian) Gulf countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran. We don't hide it."
[-- Hadi al-Amari]

"The Americans use the Interior Ministry commandos as tools to fight the insurgency. They know what Badr is doing and they don't care," "The interests of the Americans are the same as Badr."
[-- Omar al-Jabouri, an Iraqi Islamic Party (Sunni) top official]

... Iraqi Islamic Party and the Muslim Scholars Association, [documented hundreds of abductions by] men wearing Interior Ministry uniforms [where the abductees were] later .. found dead.

... 169 men, most of them Sunnis, were found in an Interior Ministry bunker in Baghdad's Jadriyah neighborhood.

[While acknowledging Jadriyah was rogue Interior Ministry intel operation,] "It's not clear this was an official MOI (Ministry of Interior) organization," "If you look at the MOI organizational charts, you will not find the Jadriyah bunker."
[-- anonymous senior U.S. military official in Baghdad]

... Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI] ... installed ... Bayan Jabr, as the head of the Interior Ministry.

"Everybody says you have a Badr guy in the MOI. Well ... he was elected," "And they say he's appointed a bunch of Badr guys. We have a Republican administration in America, and guess what? They've appointed a lot of Republicans. You elected SCIRI, and SCIRI is Badr."
[-- anonymous senior U.S. military official in Baghdad]

"I don't know that it's the quote Badr corps that's [rounding up and killing Sunnis] or ... [Mutaqda al-Sadr's] Mahdi that's doing it, but I have no doubt that people who are associated with those groups are involved."
[--Gen. Casey]

"It's not infiltration. They're upfront about [militia affiliations] and day to day things are OK, but then there's a crisis," "What you see happening is that people are ... signing up but their loyalties lie more to a militia leader than a chief of police."
[--Gen. Casey]

A memo [from Brig. Gen. Abdul Kareem Khalaf,] an Iraqi general in the ministry operations room ... to the minister's office says ... "Names of detainees." ... 14 men ... taken from ... a Sunni neighborhood in ... early morning hours ... It ... marks the time of their detention ...

[Their bodies were] found ... ... most ... killed by single gunshots to [the] heads.

[Gen Khalaf:]confirmed [memo's] authenticity. ... [said] insurgents, not Interior Ministry police, had abducted the men.

"The minister is very upset. He wants to know how such a document slipped out of the ministry."
[-- Gen Khalaf]

"Sadr City is probably our most secure zone because of the de facto militia presence ... the Mahdi militias doing their neighborhood patrols," "And you also have Badr patrols where you have SCIRI enclaves."
[Col. Joseph DiSalvo, brigade commander Army's 3rd ID:]

"The coalition forces cannot enforce it (the law forbidding militias). We cannot negate the militias. It would be like having a 2 million-man tribe, and all of a sudden saying, `Tribe, you do not exist,'""You'd have to have more manpower than is feasible."
[-- Col. Joseph DiSalvo]

© 2005 KR Washington Bureau and wire service sources.

13 Dec 2005 by Simon W. Moon

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