Questions for the Senators on the SSCI
The Report and the Committee

1) Would you characterize the committee as being split along party lines with regards to the priority that should be assigned to completing and publishing the second phase of the report?
2) In your estimation how close to completion is the second phase of the report?
3) What is your estimate of the chances that the second phase of the report will ever be completed?
4) What is your estimate of the chances that the second phase of the report will ever be published?


Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by Groups Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

1) Given what you've seen so far, what characterizations ought you make of the activities of the Office of Special Plans and the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group?
2) In what you've seen so far, how well documented are the authorizations for the questioned activities of these two groups?

Senator Roberts said that he'd "love to get Doug Feith... [from the OSP]... back before the committee." Senator Roberts also said there was a statement to the effect that "some of the activities [in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy] may have been illegal."
3) Specifically, what activities is Senator Roberts discussing?
4) How would you characterize Feith's previous appearance(s) before the committee in this matter? Was he under oath when he appeared?
5) Is there anyone else from the either the OSP or the PCTEG who has been called before the committee in this matter?
6) If Feith and/or others from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy were to appear before the committee again, would such testimony be under oath?


Potential Pressures on Analysts

Senator Roberts said that the CICUSRWMD "found no pressure to pressure any kind of--any kind of analysts." However, none of the CICUSRWMD six terms of reference included an examination of these sorts of issues.
Has this committee found any "pressure to pressure any kind of--any kind of analysts?"


The Iraqi National Congress

1) How would you characterize the Intelligence Community's use of information provided directly and/or indirectly by the Iraqi National Congress?
2) How would you characterize the dissemination of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress to the American public?
3) How influential do you think this information was to members of Congress?
4) How influential do you think this information was to the electorate?


Public Statements and Intelligence Information

How well substantiated by intelligence information were public statements, reports, and testimony by U.S. Government officials made after the Gulf War period and prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom regarding the likelihood of Iraq initiating an attack on the United States either directly or by proxy?
10 May 2005 by Simon W. Moon

Spoke w/ Rockefeller's People
I had to submit a writing sample of all things. I talked to Stuart Chapman who has promised to send my request to people who can send my request to people or some such something.
Next stop is Senators Roberts office.
04 May 2005 by Simon W. Moon

Spoke w/ Levin's Office
I spoke to a charming lady @ Senator Levin's office today. She suggested that Mr. Levin was not who I should talk to- that I should talk to Rockefeller and Roberts instead. The runaround begins.
She did send me this bit that Mr. Levin did in his capacity as an Armed Services Committee member:
Report of an Inquiry into the Alternative Analysis of the Issue of an Iraq-al Qaeda Relationship
by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee October 21, 2004

As decribed by it's press release:
"The report demonstrates how intelligence relating to the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship was exaggerated by high ranking officials in the Department of Defense to support the Administration’s decision to invade Iraq when the intelligence assessments of the Intelligence Community did not make a sufficiently compelling case. The Intelligence Community’s analysis of the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship as a relatively weak one was as definitive as reliable reporting would permit, and their conclusions were subsequently supported by the 9/11 Commission and the Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq."
25 Apr 2005 by Simon W. Moon

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