Aras / Aziz Kareem Habib
Aras Karim Habib, Aras Kareem, Aziz Habib,

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Iraq Turns Hot for Three of Chalabi's U.S. Aides
By Richard Leiby
Sunday, June 13, 2004; Page D03

[Virginia's Boxwood Inc., Francis Brooke, president,& Margaret Bartel, director] ...received Pentagon funds for Chalabi's party. Another director is Aras Karim Habib, who served as the Iraqi National Congress's intelligence chief and is now a fugitive from an Iraqi arrest warrant. (Several press reports say the CIA has long considered him a paid agent for Iranian intelligence; he has denied it.)

Iraqi Doctor, Once on C.I.A.'s Payroll, Fights to Stay in U.S.

Much of the questioning during the morning session today focused on Dr. Ali's relationship with his cousin, Aras, whom American officials maintained in documents had a connection with Iranian intelligence agents and was, in part, the basis for the government's decision to hold him as a security threat.

The Radicalization of James Woolsey

Now, in cross-examination by Woolsey and his fellow counsel, it emerged that all along, in the background, the C.I.A. had been pulling the strings. F.B.I. agents testified that Ali had been targeted because his cousin, Aras, the resistance commander in northern Iraq, was deemed by the C.I.A. to be on the Iranian payroll.

Signs evident U.S. is changing Iraq policy

Aras Kareem -- a man previously considered so dangerous in U.S. intelligence circles that his cousin, Ali Karim, who sought asylum was detained in a California jail in part because of his association with him -- arrived last week in Washington for a series of meetings with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency on tactical training.

Les articles de Med Intelligence:L'Irak

... Aras Karim is a true professional - [and surprisingly a ], ...Kurdish Iraqi, converted to Shiism after the the ayatollah Komeyni seized power in Teheran. Constrained to exile himself, he joins the Pasdaran then, after the first war of the Gulf, he joined in Kurdistan Massoud Barzani, leader of the PDK, which sends him in its intelligence services.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Iran Report
5 November 2001, Volume 4, Number 42

"Al-Watan al-Arabi" reported on 26 October... a November 2000 meeting in Berlin that was attended by mid-level officials from Washington, Tehran, Islamabad, Ankara, and Moscow. Most of the Iranian participants came from the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps' intelligence unit. ...these discussions ... focused on the future role of the Tehran-based Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)... [The paper also] reported that Washington at the time suggested a 44-year old Shia Kurd named Aras Karim as an opposition leader that all sides might accept.

Chronicle of a war foretold: on the move with Ahmad Chalabi, the man who would be king

Chalabi's chief of operations, a young Kurd named Aras Karim, tells us what the border protocol will be.

Ahmed Chalabi, l'exilé revenu courtiser les Bédouins

[Free Iraqi Forces] colonel Aras Habib Karim


Other Iraqis involved in a future government – at the behest of Wolfowitz – include INC members Salem Chalabi (Chalabi’s nephew) and Aras Habib.

Chalabi's forces enter Baghdad

Aras Kareem, leader of the about 700-strong Free Iraqi Forces

'Nazi' files incriminate top Iraqis

Chalabi's discovery of the files followed work by an underground network begun in 2000 and called the Information Collection Program, run by Aras Karim.

In denial: the big cards in Saddam’s pack

Aras Karim, head of the INC’s effort to capture leading members of Saddam’s ruling Ba’ath party, was exasperated. He had brought in al-Tikriti but gained little information that would help in his quest for Saddam.

Exclusive: Cheney and the ‘Raw’ Intelligence

...a June 2002 memo written by INC lobbyist Entifadh Qunbar to a U.S. Senate committee ...not only describes Cheney aide Hannah as a “principal point of contact” for the program, it even provides his direct White House telephone number.

Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller Issue Statement on Intelligence Committee’s Review of Pre War Intelligence in Iraq

Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS), Chairman, and Senator Jay Rockefeller IV (D-WV), Vice Chairman, of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today announced that the Committee unanimously agreed to refine the terms of reference of the Committee’s ongoing inquiry into pre war intelligence with regard to Iraq. The new terms are as follows:
G. the use by the Intelligence Community of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC).

Officials: U.S. still paying millions to group that provided false Iraqi intelligence

The INC's Information Collection Program started in 2001 and was "designed to collect, analyze and disseminate information" from inside Iraq, according to a letter the group sent in June 2002 to the staff of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

The letter, a copy of which was obtained by Knight Ridder, said the information went directly to "U.S. government recipients" who included William Luti, a senior official in Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld's office, and John Hannah, a top national security aide to Cheney.

INC Jockeying to Control New Iraqi Intelligence Agency
The New York Sun March 1, 2004, p. 1

Since December, the ICP is turning into what may be the intelligence service for a sovereign Iraq, tentatively being dubbed either the Iraqi Military Intelligence Request or the Iraqi Security Service. Under the leadership of longtime INC spy chief, Aras Habib Karem, the organization has expanded its ranks to include intelligence operatives from the two major Kurdish parties, the INA and Sciri. Mr. Karem is an acting deputy at the Ministry of Interior... In its intelligence service capacity, the ICP has screened applicants to the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps... The Iraqi commander of the new battalion,Ya'arub al-Hashimi, was a Major under the INC's old armed militia.

Meet the Press Transcript for May 16 2004

Russert: ...Curveball...

Powell: turned out that the sourcing was inaccurate and wrong and in some cases, deliberately misleading.

Pentagon cuts off INC intel funds

Approximately one-fifth of the verbal debriefings of sources in Iraq are carried out by the ICP, say administration officials and military documents.

Rethinking the Chalabi Connection

Bush administration officials say the latest intelligence indicates he [Chalabi] may have been supplying the Iranians with information on U.S. security operations in Iraq that could “get people killed.” Senior White House aides have been briefed on this information, officials said.
Crime and Politics

The Central Criminal Court of Iraq] also investigating whether INC officials, including Chalabi and his intelligence chief, Aras Habib, misused the Baath Party files they seized upon being helped into Iraq early by the U.S. military. Chalabi ultimately became head of the De-Baathification Committee, and U.S. officials believe that some Iraqis have been threatened with blackmail by being identified as Baath Party members if they declined to do the INC’s bidding, the CPA official said.

Agency: Chalabi group was front for Iran

The Defense Intelligence Agency has concluded that a U.S.-funded arm of Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress has been used for years by Iranian intelligence to pass disinformation to the United States and to collect highly sensitive American secrets, according to intelligence sources.
"Iranian intelligence has been manipulating the United States through Chalabi by furnishing through his Information Collection Program information to provoke the United States into getting rid of Saddam Hussein," said an intelligence source Friday who was briefed on the Defense Intelligence Agency's conclusions, which were based on a review of thousands of internal documents.

Chalabi Aides Suspected of Spying for Iran

The inquiries are focusing on allegations of corruption, kidnapping and robbery, and on a U.S. suspicion that one of Chalabi's closest advisers is a paid agent of the Iranian intelligence service, according to U.S., INC and Iraqi police officials. The adviser, Aras Habib, has a long working relationship with the Defense Intelligence Agency and is now a fugitive.

Ahmad Chalabi's Fall From Grace

Meanwhile, Stahl reports that "grave concerns" about the true nature of Chalabi's relationship with Iran started after the U.S. obtained "undeniable intelligence" that Chalabi met with a senior Iranian intelligence, a "nefarious figure from the dark side of the regime - an individual with a direct hand in covert operations directed against the United States."

Chalabi suspected of giving U.S. secrets to Iran

U.S. intelligence officials on Friday said Ahmed Chalabi, a member of the Iraqi Governing Council with ties to senior Pentagon officials, gave intelligence secrets to Iran so closely held in the U.S. government that only "a handful" of senior officials know them.
Meanwhile, government sources said the FBI is investigating who may have passed on the classified information to Chalabi.

Chalabi aide is suspected spy

A U.S. intelligence source said information about Karim's activities came in part from a detainee at the military prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba...

Shortly after the Ayatollah Komeinei assumed power in Iran, Karim began espousing fundamentalist Shia ideas and fled Iraq to take refuge in Iran.

Chalabi dumped over alleged Iran links
Administration officials believe his intelligence chief - named in an arrest warrant issued during a raid on Mr Chalabi's home and offices on Thursday - is an Iranian spy.
Intelligence chief Aras Karim Habib, 47...

(...Chalabi's role in the invade Iraq)
Jane Mayer.
The New Yorker, June 7, 2004 v80 i15 p058
© 2004 Condé Nast Publications Inc.

[Ahmad Chalabi]...undergraduate and a master's ...MIT ...PhD ...University of Chicago [all math].

"I followed very closely how Roosevelt, who abhorred the Nazis, at a time when isolationist sentiment was paramount in the United States, managed adroitly to persuade the American people to go to war. I studied it with a great deal of respect; we learned a lot from it. The Lend-Lease program committed Roosevelt to enter on Britain's side--so we had the Iraq Liberation Act, which committed the American people for the liberation against Saddam." [--Ahmad Chalabi]
...Chalabi had lobbied tirelessly for...[ILA] legislation.
...Chalabi's Baghdad home [& offices] ...raided Iraqi police ...supported by American troops.
"It's customary when great events happen that the U.S. punishes its friends and rewards its enemies." [--Chalabi]
...Chalabi developed [CIA] enemies and questioned his ethics ...[Chalabi] close bond ...[w/Cheney & Pentagon civliians] ...Paul Wolfowitz ...Douglas Feith ...William J.Luti.
"There is a smear campaign that says I am responsible for the liberation of Iraq.""But how bad is that?" [--Chalabi]

[USG gave $100mil to INC (GWB Admin $39mil or more).] ...what the INC provided in exchange ...yet to be fully explained.
"I clarified the picture."[--Chalabi]
[Critics:]...he distorted it.
[Diplo & intel allege:] ...exaggerating the security threat ...defectors ...[w/] misleading or bogus testimony ...questionable stories connecting Saddam to Al Qaeda ...[misunderestimating difficulty of replacing Saddam w/] ...Western-style democracy.

[Chalabi raid and termination of INC's $342k/mo via USG] ...authorized by the White House...
Chalabi's allies at the Pentagon were not notified of the raid in advance...
...allegations ...[INC] members ....embezzlement, theft ...kidnapping. ...Baghdad police...investigating...[INC] lieutenants fled Iraq. [Some for Iran]

...[INC intel chief] Aras Karim Habib ...escaped... ...under investigation [giving Iranians secrets]...
[Chalabi aide:] ...[INC] will be accused of telling [Iran the US] ...cracked one of its internal codes.
"They are charges put out by George Tenet and his C.I.A. to discredit us." [--Ahmad Chalabi, " Meet the Press "]

[Vincent Cannistraro, ex-CIA, counter-terrorism:] ...Pentagon officials connected to Chalabi ...[FBI investigation] whether an American official gave ...[INC secrets] on Iran.

"I think there's quite a bit of street legend out there that somehow he is the favorite of the Defense Department, and we had some idea of installing him as the leader of Iraq." [--P.Wolfowitz Deputy Secretary of Defense]

[Of Office of Special Plans documents-]
"Every list of Iraqis they wanted to work with for positions in the government of postwar Iraq included Chalabi and all of the members of his organization." [State Department official]

"Anyone who wants to take power in Baghdad is crazy. I'm just in this to get rid of Saddam." [--Chalabi, LA Times 1994]
"Never is a very long time." [--Chalabi 2004]

"By coming out in open, bitter opposition to the latest U.S. transition plan and its rehabilitation of senior Baathists, Chalabi seems to have crossed a final red line..." [-- Jim Hoagland, Washington Post ]

"Chalabi is one of the smartest people I know." "...[Chalabi] figured out in the eighties that the road to Baghdad ran through Washington. He cultivated whom he needed to know. If he didn't get what he wanted from State, he went to Capitol Hill. It's a sign of being effective. It's not his fault that his strategy succeeded. It's not his fault that the Bush Administration believed everything he said. Should they have? Of course not. They should have looked critically. He's not a liar; he believed the information he was purveying, and part of it was valuable. But his goal was to get the U.S. to invade Iraq." [--Peter Galbraith]

...[Francis Brooke,] Chalabi's unofficial [DC] lobbyist... house...owned by Levantine Holdings, a Chalabi family corporation based in Luxembourg.
...1991 [PR job w/] Rendon Group... ...John Rendon [ex exec dir of DNC] ...[Brooke's Rendon project] funded by the CIA...

[1991-05 GHWB's] "lethal finding" ...authorized [$100mil for CIA to] "create the conditions for removal of Saddam Hussein from power."
" an ape beating its chest. No one had any expectation of marching into Baghdad and killing Saddam. It was an impossibility." [--Robert Baer ex-CIA, Iraq]]
[CIA] decided to create an external opposition movement to Saddam.
[CIA] outsourced the Iraq project to the Rendon Group.
[Brooke:] ...[Rendon's contract had] ten percent "management fee" on top of whatever money it spent.
"We tried to burn through forty million dollars a year." "It was a very nice job." [--F. Brooke]
"It was a campaign environment, with a lot of young people, and no set hierarchy." "It was great. We had a real competitive advantage. We knew something about the twenty-four-hour media cycle, and how to manage a media campaign. CNN was new at that point. No one else knew how to do these things, but Rendon was great at issue campaigns." [--F. Brooke]
[Rendon] reprimanded ...when too many ...stories [w/ Rendon supplied info in] American press, thereby transgressing laws that prohibited domestic propaganda.
"It was amazing how well it worked. It was like magic." [--F. Brooke]
...Rendon Group ...[charged] to create ... [an Iraqi] opposition movement.
"That is when I first met Dr. Chalabi," [--F. Brooke]

"Chalabi had rare administrative competence." [--Frank Anderson, ex-CIA]
[ex-INC member:] ...[1992-06 Vienna INC meeting, not] enough backing ...[to put Chalabi on INC] board. ...[Chalabi] somehow ...added... (Chalabi claims ...[unanimous] support...)

[Chalabi] convicted ...[Jordanian] bank fraud...
[1993 INC leader,] questions arose.
"The agency didn't know how he spent his money. All transactions were cash." [--ex-INC associate]
[INC Kurds:] ...Chalabi wouldn't tell ...about ...finances.
[ex-CIA officer:] ...successive audits identified no wrongdoing. ...but that many expenditures were wasteful.
"[INC] refused to cooperate with an audit because they argued that it would breach the secrecy of the operation." "It was a real headache." [--ex-CIA officer]

"He was like the American Ambassador to Iraq." "He could get to the White House and the C.I.A. He would move around Iraq with five or six Land Cruisers." "If he was dangerous, [Saddam] could have killed him at any time. He was the perfect opposition leader." [--R. Baer]
[>$100k/mo...]"to this shadowy operator--in cars, salaries--and it was just a Potemkin village." "[Chalabi] was reporting no intel; it was total trash. The INC's intelligence was so bad, we weren't even sending it in." [CIA double-checked INC reports]"...there was no detail, no sourcing--you couldn't see it on a satellite." [--R. Baer]
[R. Baer:] ...went with Chalabi [1994] to visit [INC] "forgery shop"...
"It was something like a spy novel," "It was a room where people were scanning Iraqi intelligence documents into computers, and doing disinformation. There was a whole wing of it that he did forgeries in." "...he was forging back then, in order to bring down Saddam." [--R. Baer]
[R. Baer:] [INC forged] ...letter to Chalabi ...[from] Clinton's National Security Council. [Asking] for Chalabi's help ...[w/ US] assassination plot against Saddam.
"It was a complete fake." [--R. Baer]
[R. Baer:] effort to ...[get] Iranians ...[to join] plot against Saddam; [US] involvement, Chalabi hoped, would convince...
[Brooke:] ...[INC ran] forgery shop, but ...Chalabi [had not] created ...[forged] letter.
"That would be illegal." [--F. Brooke]
[Letter led to CIA accusing Baer of involvement w/ assassination plans.]

"We knew we had to create a domestic constituency with some electoral clout, so we decided to use the AIPAC [American Israel Public Affairs Committee] model." [--F. Brooke]
[Chalabi] spoke of restoring the oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Haifa... [1998 Jerusalem Post]

...[1998-01-27 Chalabi meets w/] Scott Ritter... ...[saying INC operatives] ...penetrated Saddam's circle...
[Ritter:](Ahmed Alawi, an I.N.C. official, also attended the meeting.)
"I should have asked him what he could give me," "Instead, I let him ask me, 'What do you need?'" "We made the biggest mistake in the intelligence business: we identified all of our gaps." [--S. Ritter]
...[Ritter] told ...of ...weapons laboratories [suspiscions]...
"We made that up!" "We told Chalabi, and, lo and behold, he's fabricated a source for the mobile labs." [--S. Ritter]

...[Chalabi] showed Ritter two ...overthrow [scenarios]. ...General Wayne Downing... ...Iraqi insurgents would be able to topple Saddam almost by themselves.
"I said, 'I don't think the small units could do the jobs you're saying. It's a ploy.'" "So how come the fact that you'd need more American assistance is not in the plan?" [--S. Ritter]
[Chalabi via Ritter:] "Because it's too sensitive."
"He told me that, if I played ball, when he became President [of Iraq] he'd control all of the oil concessions, and he'd make sure I was well taken care of. I guess it was supposed to be a sweetener." [--S. Ritter]
[Chalabi's office says Ritter] "liar."

[General Anthony Zinni re Chalabi's military plan:]
"It got me pretty angry." "...pie in the sky, a fairy tale." "They were saying if you put a thousand troops on the ground Saddam's regime will collapse, they won't fight. I said, 'I fly over them every day, and they shoot at us. We hit them, and they shoot at us again. No way a thousand forces would end it.' The exile group was giving them inaccurate intelligence. Their scheme was ridiculous."

[Brooke:]...[2001-02] Wolfowitz called ...promised ...Saddam would be deposed.
"Nonsense." [--Wolfowitz]

[CIA] skeptical of ...[INC supplied] defectors ...insisted on examining them independently. [What happened Here?] [GWB knew] CIA's view ...soon after taking office...
...Saddam's mobile weapons laboratories.
"...firsthand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and rails." " of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq." [--Colin Powell UN address 2003-02-05 ]

[Bob Drogin,Greg Miller, LAT] ...Curveball... ...[&] Curveball ...had been jailed for embezzlement.
[Chalabi: Curveball not related to anyone @ INC].

"These are the sorts of reports we are expected to deny?" "Anonymous reports about anonymous people? No one even knows who this person is! How are we supposed to know?" [--Chalabi]

[V. Cannistraro:] ...CIA now believes that Aras Habib ... "arranged for Curveball to be presented to the Germans." "The C.I.A. is positive of it."

[DIA Chalabi sponsors:] most ...information ...received from [INC] defectors was "of little or no value."

[Entifadh Qanbar's INC memo to Senate Appropriations Committee, 2002-06-26:]
[INC gave raw intel to] "U.S. government recipients," including William Luti, at the Pentagon, and John Hannah...

...[INC] "product" [in] some of the most disputed [pre-war] journalism...
[2000-12-20 NYT Judith Miller] ...Iraqi engineer [Adnan Ihsan Saheed al-Haideri]...[w/] direct knowledge ...secret ...weapons sites...
[INC] helped [al-Haideri] leave Iraq ...[&] arranged the interview...
[INC provided] ...Haideri story three days after he had shown deception in a [DIA / CIA] polygraph...
"[Haideri] was a gold mine" of information, and that "even if only three per cent of it was true" it was worthwhile. [--DIA via Chalabi aide]

"Accounts of Iraqi defectors were not always weighed against their strong desire to have Saddam Hussein ousted." "It looks as if we, along with the administration, were taken in." [--NYT 2004?-05-26 re NYT pre-war coverage]
Patrick E. Tyler [NYT chief correspondent]...hired Chalabi's niece, Sarah Khalil, to be ...[NYT's Kuwait] office manager... ...Tamara [Chalabi said] ...Khalil helped her father's [Ahmad's] efforts while she was working for the Times.
[2003-04] Chalabi was stranded [by US forces]...
Chalabi ...[called] Khalil...
[Tamara Chalabi:] Khalil commandeered [INC] money ...rounded up ...SUVs, which she herself led ...into Iraq.
[2003-05-20 NYT fired Khalil]

[INC disseminated Atta / Prague story.]
[INC sponsored defector w/ INC translator, Abu Zeinab al-Qurairy - Salman Pak story 2002-02 Vanity FairR, David Rose]
[INC sponsored defector, Sabah Khalifa Khodada al-Lami - Salman Pak + anthrax 2001-11-12.]

"We didn't mislead anyone." "We said we had information. We didn't say the information was great. We thought it would be useful." "I believed they were who they said they were." [--Chalabi]

{"Anonymous reports about anonymous people? No one even knows who this person is! How are we supposed to know?" [--Chalabi]}

...[Khidhir Hamza scientist & sr admin of 1980s Iraqi Nuke program] defected 1994. ...1997 ...[w/] Institute for Science and International Security by David Albright...
[INC phoned Hamza.] "We saw the claws of Chalabi then." "Hamza was shaken, and said he'd never do that again." [--D. Albright]

"Saddam's Bombmaker" [1999 Hamza w/] Jeff Stein...
[D. Albright:] ...many of the claims ...including ...[Hamza's] importance ..."were just ridiculous."
[D. Albright:] Francis Brooke "was involved" in promoting Hamza's book. "It was clear he had a part in it."

"Look, our focus was on Saddam's crimes, moral crimes, genocide." "We were not focussed on W.M.D. The U.S. asked us. We didn't bring these people up; they asked us! They requested this help from us." [--Chalabi]

[Johns Hopkins prof ME studies, Fouad Ajami, war idea supporter & war execution critic]

[Chalabi:] [GWB Admin's Iraqi interim govt plan] ...for Bush's ...campaign...

[ex-INC member:] ...Free Iraqi Fighters ...accused of looting and robbing... ...had stolen a fleet of SUVs ...then sold them abroad.
[Baghdadi cops:] ...Al Baya station ...arrested for stealing cars and having false I.D.s.
...CPA official confirmed ...[may be] more charges...
"What war doesn't have this? Can you guarantee that no Coalition soldiers looted anything?" [--Chalabi]

...Chalabi's "de-Baathification" program...
[FIF credited w/ >1/2 of 55 Most Wanted Baathists by DIA]
[ex-US diplo & ex-FIF:] ...[Chalabi's "de-Baathification" program] devolved ...[houses] were expropriated by Chalabi's aides.
[Iraqi official via Newsweek:] ...[$500k] for de-Baathification had disappeared. Chalabi denied ...corruption...

Chalabi heads [IGC] finance committee ...[installed] the oil, finance, and trade ministers, ...governor of Iraq's Central Bank [Sinan Shabibi].
Ali Allawi, the Minister of Trade and Defense, is Chalabi's nephew.
Nabeel Musawi [ex-INC spokesman] ...deputy on the Governing Council.
Abdul Huda Farouki ...Nour USA and Erinys Iraq... Farouki ...[borrowed] from Petra Bank.
"There are so many bribes and kickbacks!" [--Chalabi on CPA corruption]

"I don't know and I'm not sure [a corruption charge] matters. No one said you have to be a saint to be a patriot." [--Danielle Pletka, American Enterprise Intstitute, AEI]

White House [asked Lakhdar Brahimi] to form [IGC] ...[Brahimi] refused to recruit [any INC]...

[INC got UNO4F docs (UN Oil for Food)]

...[2004-05-27] Chalabi participated in a [Najaf] sit-in ...[to end US] crackdown against Moqtada al-Sadr... [US pulled back concurrently.]

...[CNN asked about Chalabi's makeover] as a religious leader...
"Why is this a concern?" [--Chalabi]
...Chalabi's ...turn toward Shiite nationalism...
...[INC intel boss, Aras Habib,] long ...suspected of spying for Iran.
[Chalabi:] ...Habib had passed a [2002] CIA polygraph test ..[re] Iran ...[no] access to U.S. classified materials.
...[2003-11 Tehran, Chalabi met w/] Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security.
[Just prior to invasion, Chalabi in US-purchased] ...gated villa in Tehran [for INC]
"There are geopolitical reasons to be friendly with Iran." "Iran has the longest border with Iraq. Also, Iran is a much stronger state than Iraq, with three times the population. So strategically it's not a good idea to be on bad terms. My good relations were not a secret from the U.S." [--Chalabi]

[Ahmad's US trouble bcuz he's] "a foreigner, and an Arab, had beaten the Administration at their own game, in their own back yard." [--Tamara Chalabi]

[Iraqi] polls ...Chalabi approval ratings lower than ...Hussein['s].

Article A117790062
27 Aug 2005 by Simon W. Moon